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Norwegian government policy is to increase the supply of psychiatric services to 
children and young persons, both by increasing the number of personnel and by 
increasing productivity in the psychiatric outpatient clinics (BUP). Increased 
accessibility to services is observed for the last years, measured as the number of 
children receiving services every year. The question is to what extent this is related to 
increased productivity. The paper aims to estimate change in productivity among 
outpatient clinics. Questions whether change in productivity is related to the personnel 
mix of the clinics, growth in treatment capacity or change in financial incentives are 
analysed. We utilise a non-parametric method called Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to estimate a best-practise production frontier. The potential for efficiency 
improvement are estimated as the difference between actual and best-practice 
performance, while allowing for trade-offs between different staff groups and different 
mixes of service production. A Malmquist output-based productivity index is calculated, 
decomposed in technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change and frontier shifts. 
The paper analyses panel data on the psychiatric outpatient clinics of Norway for the 
period of 1996-2001. Output is measured as number of direct and indirect patient-
related interventions (visits and consultations) while input is measured by usage of 
different types of personnel. The results indicate increased overall productivity, with 
important contribution from increased technical efficiency. Personell growth has a 
negative influence on productivity growth, while a growth in the share of university 
educated personell improves productivity. The financial reform of 1997 that gave 
greater weight for interventions per patient lead to lower productivity growth in the 
subsequent period for those that had an inital budgetary gain from the reform. 
 




A government white paper in 1996 presented both an increase in capacity and an increase in 
productivity as central political goals for the psychiatric health care sector (Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs 1997).  To secure an increase in resources a national plan has been 
implemented from 1999 (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1998). To increase 
productivity, however, no particular measures have been taken other than increased political 
and public focus on the utilisation of resources. The purpose of this paper is to assess the 
effects of this strategy of  combined resource growth and “mild coercion”. We do so by 
focussing on psychiatric services for children and youths.  
 
In Norway roughly 95 per cent of psychiatric services for children and youths are delivered in 
an outpatient setting. They are mainly aimed at treating emotional and mental disorders as 
well as correcting undesired behavioural patterns. Services are delivered both as direct 
therapy to the patient and indirectly in the form of interaction with the patient’s environment 
(relatives, schools etc). It is generally assumed that approximately 5 per cent of all youths 
under 18 are in need of specialised psychiatric health care (Verhulst, Berden et al. 1985; 
Lavigne, Gibbons et al. 1996). Based on this figure it was estimated that as much as 60 per 
cent of Norwegian youths in need of specialised psychiatric health care did not receive such 
care in 1996 (Halsteinli 1998). At the same time the number of consultations pr therapist day 
in psychiatric outpatient clinics were shown to be as low as 1.1 (Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs 1997). Thus at this time, it was concluded that the sector seemed to be characterised 
by a too low capacity level as well as low level of productivity.  
 
When levels of productivity are low, a natural response is to review the payment system with 
the aim of providing incentives for increased efficiency. In 1996 psychiatric outpatient clinics 
were financed via two sources; around 60 per cent of the income was provided from the 
counties by the way of a global budget or lump sum earmarked grants
2. The additional 40 per 
cent was financed from the state via the National Insurance scheme and related partly to the   3
number of patients treated and partly to the number of employees at the clinic. Up until 1997 
the patient related income consisted of a one-time fee for the first consultation only. From 
1997, however, an additional fee for multiple interventions was introduced.  Thus, for a given 
number of patients there was now a stronger incentive to provide more interventions per 
patient. It should be noted, however, that even after this change as much as 95per cent of the 
outpatient clinic income remains unrelated to the patent related activity. Thus the strongest 
incentive provided by the financing system is still to increase number of employees. 
 
With only marginal changes to the financing system the gap between demand and supply of 
services had to be closed by other means. The chosen strategy contained two elements; a 
strong public and political focus on low levels of productivity and a growth the amount of 
resources put in to the sector in order to increase capacity. Suspecting that variations in 
efficiency could be attributed to variations in organisational models, the National Board of 
Health in 1998 initiated a project that were to review the working processes of psychiatric 
outpatient clinics. This project received much attention within the sector, and the resulting 
report suggested several areas where changes might lead to improved productivity (Hatling 
and Magnussen 1999). As a follow up the National Board of Health has begun implementing 
practice guidelines from 2001.  
 
That the authorities in a situation with severe undercapacity and seemingly low levels of 
efficiency chose not to focus on the financing system is interesting. We especially note that 
that this strategy is in stark contrast to the somatic sector where increased activity and 
productivity was sought after mainly by changing the financing system (Biørn, Hagen et al. 
2002). This difference may, in part, be explained by the lack of patient classification systems 
a la the DRG system for psychiatric patients. Still the lack of psychiatric DRGs cannot fully 
explain why the authorities chose to stick to a financing system where the main incentive was 
to increase staffing rather than activity. The situation in the somatic sector prior to the reform 
of the financing system in 1997 was not that dissimilar to the situation in the psychiatric 
sector. Long waiting lists and high waiting times was the main motivation for the reform. 
Furthermore, the financial reform in the somatic sector was partly justified by the belief that 
increase in resources alone would only lead to lower levels of efficiency.  
                                                                                                                                                          
2 For the period analysed in this paper the 19 county councils were responsible for the financing and delivery of 
specialised health care services. From 2002 this responsibility are transferred to 5 state owned regional health 
corporations.    4
 
The effects of the financial reform of the somatic sector (Biørn, Hagen et al. 2002) indicates 
that the financial reform in the somatic sector led to a productivity growth of approximately 2 
per cent. The goal for psychiatric outpatient care as it was formulated in public documents in 
1996 was for a productivity growth of 50 per cent.   This was, of course, optimistic, and the 
purpose of this paper is to see whether this strategy of combining external pressure, resource 
growth and a minor change in the financing system actually succeeded in increasing levels of 
productivity to the extent foreseen. We shall proceed to do this by utilising the concept of a 
decomposed Malmquist index to measure the growth of productivity over the six-year period, 
1996-2001. We limit the discussion to Norwegian psychiatric outpatient clinics for children 
and youths (“BUP-clinics”
3). The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a 
more thorough description of the behaviour in and activity of outpatient clinics for children 
and youth, and provide the background for the empirical analysis that follows. Section 3 
discusses the measurement of inputs and outputs, and present the methodology used. Results 
are presented and discussed in section 4, while section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. BUP clinics – organisation, behaviour and activity. 
 
Generally the production of health care services takes place in an organisationally complex 
environment, making it difficult to formulate precise behavioural models. In the setting of 
BUP-clinics this is even more difficult. The main purpose of these clinics is to correct 
undesirable behaviour. This may involve only the patient and the therapist, but will often be 
more complex, involving several different therapists and include family (parents and siblings) 
and school. As is the case for many psychiatric illnesses it is often difficult to set a precise 
diagnosis. This leads to a situation where there are few standardised treatment programmes, 
and thus difficult to characterise the activity of outpatient clinics by means of homogenous 
diagnostic groups. Furthermore this leads to a situation where each outpatient clinic to a large 
degree has discretion regarding the type of personnel needed to provide treatment, the type 
and quantity of services that are to be delivered to the patients and the duration of treatment.  
 
                                                 
3 The term BUP is an abbrivation for the Norwegian ”children and youths”.   5
There is clear evidence that different personnel groups both pursue different goals and have 
different views as for how the treatment process should be organised (Hatling and Magnussen 
1999). In this setting it does not seem fruitful to use standard models of hospital behaviour 
(Chalkley and Malcomson 2000) where one hospital decision maker interact with one 
principal. Psychiatric outpatient clinics will be characterised by multiple decision makers 
providing an array of services in a heterogeneous environment both with respect to means and 
goals. We therefore choose to proceed on a more ad-hoc basis when we formulate the specific 
questions that we believe is worth pursuing in an empirical analysis 
 
First, on a purely descriptive basis, we are interested in whether or not there is a growth in 
total productivity in the sector in the period 1996-2001, and given the aim of a 50 per cent 
increase, also in its magnitude. 
 
Second, we are interested in studying where a growth in productivity has taken place. More 
specifically; is growth in productivity due to the good becoming better, or is it a case of the 
not so good catching up?  
 
Third, previous analysis (Halsteinli, Magnussen et al. 2001) suggest that there are variable 
returns to scale in the sector and we would like to pursue this by looking at the relationship 
between productivity growth and scale. 
 
Fourth, we wish to see whether the change in productivity, ceteris paribus, is negatively 
related to the growth in resources available. This assumption is derived from similar analyses 
in the somatic sector (Biørn, Hagen et al. 2002). Basically the argument is that increased 
budget levels will increase slack and thereby reduce productivity growth.  
 
Fifth; we wish to see whether the change in productivity, ceteris paribus, is related to the 
diversification of the personnel. This is motivated by the assumption that a more homogenous 
staff mix will be more unified in the pursuit of goals and thereby spend less time on effort 
reducing activities. We have no real theoretical underpinning of this hypotheses, but we note 
that the argument is pursued in the sector (Larsen and Hustoft 2002). 
 
Sixth, we wish to see whether the marginal change in the financing system had any effect on 
the growth in productivity, ceteris paribus.    6
 
We now turn to the question of how these issues should be treated empirically. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The treatment process in BUP-clinics will consist of a series of interventions related to each 
patient. These interventions can be direct, i.e. by the way of consultations, others are indirect, 
i.e. by the way of contacts with the patients environment. The interventions will be of 
different form depending on the type of disorder, the social setting and the outpatient clinic 
itself. Interventions can take place in situations where the therapist and the patient is alone, or 
in a group setting where more therapists are involved and also where the patients family is 
involved. 
 
Ideally we would model the input-output relationship using data on number of treated patients 
in homogenous groups. If this were possible inefficiencies that arise from using too many 
interventions would be detected. As noted this is not possible, since we cannot define 
homogenous patient groups. Thus what we do is assume that interventions that are provided 
are necessary and choose to measure activity as number of direct and number of indirect 
interventions. We have elsewhere (Halsteinli, Magnussen et al. 2001) performed a detailed 
analysis of how different ways of measuring input/output affect the efficiency measures. 
There we concluded that a model using number of therapist hours spent on direct patient care, 
number of therapist hours spent on indirect care, number of university educated staff and 
other staff as inputs performed well in the sense that the use of these inputs and outputs 
sufficiently captured the information content in the other variables 
 
When we in the present analysis have chosen a slightly different approach, we do this out of 
two purposes. Firstly the change in the financing system was related to changing the financing 
of interventions. Thus we believe that we may capture the potential effects of this better by 
measuring output as number of interventions. Secondly, in order to get as long a series as 
possible we have included data from years where the quality of the data on interventions are 
believed to be better than the quality of the data on number of hours. Thus we measure the 
growth in productivity by using the input and output variables in table 1.   7
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Annual means for inputs, outputs and other variables. 
    Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Outputs               
Direct interventions  1
t y   1 818  1 947  1 981  2 058  2 263  2 533 
     (1340) (1597) (1352) (1414) (1566) (1822) 
Indirect interventions  2
t y   837  917  917 1  055 1  200 1  295 
     (734) (802) (774) (779) (823) (856) 
Inputs               
University personnel.  1
t x   5.6 5.5 5.9 5.8 6.1 6.5 
    (4.2) (4.5) (4.5) (4.0) (4.2) (4.9) 
2
t x   7.8 7.9 8.0 7.6 8.0 8.7 
College and administrative 
personnel 
     (7.9) (8.4) (7.6) (7.3) (7.9) (8.3) 
Derived and other variables                
Interventions - total    2 655  2 864  2 898  3 113  3 463  3 829 
     (1932) (2289) (1983) (2052) (2204) (2448) 
Personnel - total 
t x   13.4 13.4 13.8 13.4 14.1 15.3 
     (11.7) (12.6) (11.6) (10.9) (11.7) (12.6) 
Patients treated    234 269 274 284 322 359 
     (135) (175) (156) (156) (189) (219) 
Direct interventions per therapist    167 180 184 192 198 203 
     (54) (62) (56) (46) (44) (48) 
Direct interventions per patient    7.6 7.0 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.9 
     (2.5) (2.3) (2.1) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) 
Number of outpatient clinics    51 45 56 65 67 60 
Standard deviations in brackets.               
 
 
Productivity is normally perceived as the ratio of output to input, but in the presence of 
multiple inputs and outputs these are normally weighted by their prices. As is common in 
public sector applications, output prices are nonexistent, and even input prices are difficult to 
get hold of. Building on Malmquist (1953) one can instead use an estimate of the technology 
or production possibility set to measure the change in productivity between periods (Caves, 
Christensen et al. 1982). If x is a vector of inputs and y is a vector of outputs, the production 
possibility set at time s is defined as 
  { } ( )  can be produced from   at time 
s Ps = y,x y x  (1) 
 
Technical productivity of an input-output vector ( , )
tt y x  at time t with reference to a 
technology at time s can following (Farrell 1957; Førsund and Hjalmarsson 1987) be defined 
as   8
  { } , TP Min ( , )
s tt s
t P θλ θ λθ λ =∈ yx  (2) 
This is a relative measure which compares the input-output vector ( , )
tt y x  with the vector 
that is of optimal size, keeping constant the mix of inputs and the mix of outputs respectively. 
Note that while the own-period (t=s) technical productivity will be less or equal to 1 for all 
feasible input-output vectors ( , )
tt t P ∈ yx , this does necessarily not hold for cross-period 
comparisons.  
 
Own-period technical productivity as defined in (2) can be decomposed into technical 
efficiency relative to the frontier of the production possibility set which in general will exhibit 
variable returns to scale (VRS), and scale efficiency which reflects inoptimal scale. Measured 
in an outputincreasing direction, the Farrell (1957) measure of technical efficiency is 
  { } 1 TE Min ( , )
tt t
t P λ λ λ =∈ yx  (3) 
which in our context is always relative to own-period technology. Scale efficiency can then be 
defined as the ratio of technical productivity and technical efficiency, allowing us to write the 
decomposition as 
  TP TE SE
t
tt t = i  (4) 
If the technology 
s P  is constant returns to scale (CRS), technical efficiency and technical 
productivity will coincide and the scale efficiency will be one, which is why TP
t
t  is 
sometimes known as CRS technical efficiency. 
 
The Malmquist index of productivity change from an input-output vector at time t to time u is 








=  (5) 
u M
s
t  will be greater (less) than one when productivity improves (deteriorates). Both technical 
productivities in (5) are measured relative to the same technology
s P , just as a price-based 
index would use a constant set of weights. The choice of the reference technology is 
somewhat arbitrary. Färe, Grosskopf et al. (1994) suggests using the geometric mean of 
indices calculated with each of the two years used as reference, while Berg, Førsund et al. 
(1992) argues that circularity requires the use of a fixed base year. In this paper we will use 
the envelopment of all technology frontiers as the fixed reference frontier, i.e. 
s t
t PP = ∪ ,   9
thereby fulfilling the circularity condition while at the same time utilising technology 
information from all time periods. 
 
As shown in Färe, Grosskopf et al. (1994) the Malmquist index of productivity change could 
be decomposed into two terms, reflecting the change in the productivity of the frontier relative 
to the common reference technology, and the change in own period technical productivity 
TP TP
ut
ut . Using (4), the last of these can in turn be decomposed into an index reflecting the 
change in technical efficiency and an index reflecting the change in scale efficiency. Defining 
  u
TP TP TE SE
MF , ME , MS
TP TP TE SE
su
s uu u u
tt u s u st
tt t t
== =  (6) 
we can write the three-way decomposition as 
  u u
TP TP TP TP TP TP TE SE
MM F M E M S
TP TP TP TP TP TP TE SE
ss u us u
s s uu u uu u u u
t tt u s u ss t ts t
tt t tt t t t
== = =  (7) 
 
 
To apply the malmquist index and its decomposition empirically, one needs an estimate of the 
technology 
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Figure 1: Efficiency and productivity measures with DEA frontier estimates for 
observation Q in period 1 and q in period 2   10
and further developed in the literature following Charnes, Cooper et al. (1978), can be written 
as 
  () { } 11 1
ˆ ,, 1
nn n tt t
jj jj j jj j P λλ λ
== = =≤ ≥ = ∑∑ ∑ yx y y, x x  (8) 
where (,)
tt
jj y x  is the input-output vector of observation j at time t. The DEA estimate is 
shown in (Banker, Charnes  et al. 1984) to be the minimum extrapolation set that satisfies 
feasibility, convexity and free disposal. As a nonparametric method it fits closely to the data 
and does not require the assumption of a specific functional form. The estimate of the DEA 
frontier is determined by the best practice units in each period, and is sensitive to outliers. On 
the other hand it may well underestimate the truly technical potential if no units are fully 
technologically efficient. 
 
The basic features are illustrated for the one-input one-output case in figure 1, where capital 
letters are for the first period and small letters for the second. The DEA estimated frontiers of 
the technology for each period are labelled P and p respectively. The diagonal dotted lines 
marked OH/Oh, tangent to the technology, are the absolute productivity levels (y/x) of the 
units with optimal size, while Os is the common reference productivity enveloping all yearly 
technologies. Output efficiency is measured vertically in the figure, so that an observation Q 
with an actual production of KQ and a potential production of KD has a technical output 
efficiency of KQ/KD. Had the unit adjusted both input and output to become optimally sized, 
it could achieve an output-input ratio on OH, so that its own-period technical productivity is 
KQ/KF. Relative to the common reference technology the technical productivity is KQ/KN, 
and so a move to the second period observation with productivity kq/kn is clearly an 
improvement (M>1). In the figure this productivity improvement represents a positive frontier 
shift (MF>1), a scale efficiency improvement (MS>1), but a deterioration in technical 
efficiency (ME<1). 
 
By utilising the Malmquist setup as described above, we are able to answer the first three of 
the questions formulated in section 2. The last three, however, requires additional analysis. 
Thus we use the Malmquist measures as dependant variables and regress these on a set of 
explanatory variables. Specifically we formulate: 
 
  ( )
;1 ;1 ;1 ;1
;1 ,,,,
s t tt tt tt tt
tt Mf x x u T W
+++ +
+ =     (9)   11
 
and similar relationships for its components, where  
 
12
ttt x xx =+   , i.e. the total number of personnel in year t, used here as an indicator of the size 
of the clinic. 
 
1 ;1 t tt
t x x
x












+   =
 
 , annual growth in share of personnel that are university educated, 
capturing to what extent the clinics are becoming less diversified as regards staff mix. If there 
is a relationship between the length of education and the quality of the staff this variable may 
also be interpreted as a measure of increase in staff quality.  
 
;1 tt T
+  is a time dummy, where the first period 1996-97 acts as a reference and is therefore 





tt tt Ww T
++ = , where w1996  is a dummy for those hospitals that had a case mix in 
1996 that meant that they stood to gain from the financial reform in 1996-97. It takes the 
value 1 if the number of interventions per patient exceeded seven in 1996. It is multiplied with 
the time dummy to capture any period-specific effects of the financial reform, which would be 
expected to be significant only for a limited number of years. 
 
The regression analyses were performed using fixed effects, random effects and OLS models. 
Using a Hausmann test both the random and fixed effects models are rejected. Thus we only 
present results from the OLS model. As argued in section 2, we do not formulate a formal 
model of behaviour, so the regression is only meant to reveal statistical association using a 
simultaneous method. 
   12
4. Results and discussion 
 
I section 2 we proposed six questions for the empirical analysis in this paper. Based on the 
Malmquist-indices and the regression models we now turn to the results of this analysis.  
 
Total productivity growth 
Figure 2 depicts the development in productivity from 1996 (=100) to 2001 both as an 
arithmetic mean and a geometric mean of the individual productivity changes. There is a 
substantial and significant (at the 2.5 per cent level) growth in productivity in this period. 
Mean level of productivity in 2001 is more than 25 per cent higher than it was in 1996. This 
implies an average annual growth in productivity of 4.5 per cent
4. Thus relative to a goal of a 
50 per cent change, the sector seems to have come half the way six years after the goal was 
formulated.  
                                                 
4 The number 4.5 per cent is based on a data set consisting of the 37 outpatient clinics that provided data for all 
the years between 1996 and 2001. The Salter diagram is based on a data set consisting of the 48 outpatient 
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Figure 2: Productivity change M96;t relative to 1996. Arithmetic and geometric 
mean of 37 clinics with data for all years.   13
 
 
As were to be expected, however, there are substantial differences between BUP-clinics in 
productivity growth. Figure3 shows the distribution of average annual growth in a Salter-
diagram with the width of the columns illustrating the size of the clinics as measured by the 
share of total number of interventions. Of the 48 clinics with data for the first and last year 
period, 11 showed an annual decline in productivity; the lowest with an annual decline of 
nearly 10per cent. More than three-quarters of the clinics, however, had an annual growth in 
productivity, 9 of these with an annual growth rate in excess of 10 per cent. 
 
Catching up or frontier shift? 
From a policy point of view it is of interest to see whether the level of productivity is 
increasing because of shifts in the best practice technology or because there is a change in the 
levels of efficiency relative to a constant best practice technology. In other words; are the 
good getting better or are the not so good catching up? Figure 4 shows total productivity 
growth decomposed in three effects; front shift, efficiency shifts and scale shifts.  
 
In the first four years it seems that the growth in productivity is evenly distributed between 
shifts in the best practice frontier and catching up. From 2000 to 2001, however, there is a 
Figure 3: Salter diagram of productivity change M96;01 from 1996 to 2001. 
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large positive shift in the best practice frontier, and a resulting decrease in the catching up 
effects. There seems to be no substantial change in scale efficiency in this period. Thus, on 
average, productivity growth in this period has been higher in outpatient clinics with initial 
low levels of productivity. We note, however, that while front shifts usually are termed 
“technical change” this may be misleading in this case. It is more likely that frontier shifts are 
the result of the best practice technology closing in on the theoretical frontier, than that this is 
the result of true technical change. Also, the position of the best practice frontier will depend 
only on a few of the observations. In our case observations from 2001, three BUP-clinics 
alone account for more than 50 per cent of the reference technology dominates the frontier. 
Thus the results of the decomposition of the efficiency measures will depend on the 
measurements of the inputs and outputs. Still we note that the front shift from 2000 to 2001 
remains even when “extreme” observations are removed. 
 
Scale efficiency 
Productivity growth does not seem to be explained by an increase in scale efficiency. Also, 
from the regression analysis (table 2), the size of the clinics does not influence the 












1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Productivity index M
Frontier shift index MF
Efficiency change index ME
Scale efficiency index MS
Figure 4: Decomposition of productivity index M=MF*ME*MS. Geometric 
mean of 37 clinics with data for all years.   15
 
Table 2: Regression on the Malmquist productivity index and its components.   
  
Dependent variable ;1 M
s
tt +   ;1 MF
s
tt +   ;1 MEtt +   ;1 MStt +  
Total personnel year t 0.000   0.000  -0.001   0.000  
 
t x  
(0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Growth in personnel t to t+1 -0.654***  -0.119  -0.432***  -0.054  
 
;1 tt x
+    
(0.133)   (0.072)  (0.144)   (0.066)  
Growth in university share t to t+1 0.269**  0.243***  0.066   -0.034  
 
;1 tt u
+    
(0.121)   (0.066)  (0.132)   (0.061)  
Time dummy year 1997 to 1998 -0.005   0.053  0.014   -0.102*** 
 
97;98 T  
(0.071)   (0.039)  (0.077)   (0.035)  
Time dummy year 1998 to 1999 -0.031   -0.030  0.041   -0.087** 
 
98;99 T  
(0.069)   (0.038)  (0.075)   (0.035)  
Time dummy year 1999 to 2000 -0.073   0.016  -0.087   -0.052  
 
99;00 T  
(0.069)   (0.037)  (0.074)   (0.034)  
Time dummy year 2000 to 2001 -0.037   0.106***  -0.062   -0.116*** 
 
00;01 T  
(0.069)   (0.038)  (0.075)   (0.034)  
Winner * time dummy 1996 to 1997 -0.113   -0.041  -0.064   -0.046  
 
96;97 W  
(0.069)   (0.038)  (0.075)   (0.035)  
Winner * time dummy 1997 to 1998 -0.136*  0.025  -0.066   -0.089** 
 
97;98 W  
(0.072)   (0.039)  (0.078)   (0.036)  
Winner * time dummy 1998 to 1999 -0.018   -0.019  -0.061   0.060* 
 
98;99 W  
(0.068)   (0.037)  (0.073)   (0.034)  
Winner * time dummy 1999 to 2000 0.032   -0.031  0.038   0.027  
 
99;00 W  
(0.065)   (0.036)  (0.071)   (0.033)  
Winner * time dummy 2000 to 2001 -0.014   0.025  0.017   -0.051  
 
00;01 W  
(0.066)   (0.036)  (0.071)   (0.033)  
Constant 1.545*** 0.889*** 1.475*** 1.175*** 
     (0.199)   (0.109)   (0.216)   (0.099)  
Number of valid observations  228   228  228   228  
R-squared  0.153   0.232  0.071   0.234  
Adjusted R_squared  0.106   0.189  0.019   0.191  
F   3.25***  5.4***  1.36    5.48*** 
Standard errors in brackets. Stars denote significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) respectively. Random 
effects and fixed effects models were rejected by the Hausman test. 
 
Growth in budget 
We measure growth in budgets by growth in number of personnel. From the regression 
analysis we see that growth in budget affects productivity growth negatively. On average a 1 
per cent increase in total staff will decrease productivity growth with 0.65 per cent. This result 
is interesting because it tells us that although outpatient clinics seem to respond to “mild 
coercion” by increasing productivity, this growth is slowed down by a policy that at the same   16
time increases the availability of resources. It should be noted, however, that there are 
explanations to why an increase in budgets would slow down productivity growth other than a 
decrease in effort. Specifically, at any given point in time, a share of the staff will be in 
training for a speciality. When there is a growth in staffing this share is likely to increase, and 
this will most likely slow down productivity growth. We also note that a slowdown of 
productivity growth in clinics with a large growth in budget size mainly comes as a “falling 
behind effect”. This would suggest that outpatient clinics with an initial high level of 
productivity is better equipped to handle a growth in staffing than clinics with a low initial 
level of productivity. To understand why this should be we would need, however, to perform 
a more detailed analysis of the effects of internal organisational factors on productivity.  
 
Staff diversification 
Growth in the share of university educated staff increases productivity growth. On average a 1 
per cent increase in the share of university staff increases productivity by 0,27 per cent. This 
supports our hypotheses that a more unified staff mix will increase productivity. If one 
accepts the notion that staff quality is related to share of university educated personnel
5 this 
also implies than an increase in staff quality will lead to a higher growth in productivity. We 
also note that this effect is mainly due to a frontier shift. Thus an increase in staff 
quality/share of university educated staff is most effective in clinics that already have a high 
level of efficiency. The way we have specified our model productivity will be measured 
relative to the best practice units that have a similar staff mix. Thus we cannot say whether 
staff diversification, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher or lower level of productivity.  
 
Change in financing system 
The change in the financing system did not seem to influence productivity growth, except in 
the period after the reform, when a slightly significant effect lead to lower productivity 
growth for those that had an initial budgetary gain from the reform This effect seems to have 
worked through a reduction in scale efficiency. The lack of a substantial effect of the 
financing system is not surprising, though, given the very marginal change in the system. 
                                                 
5 And this notion will be highly controversial, at least in the Norwegian setting.    17
5. Concluding comments 
Low levels of productivity and excess demand for services led authorities to implement a 
twofold strategy; increased focus on productivity combined with an increase in resources. 
From 1996 to 2001 average productivity growth was 25 per cent, and the chosen strategy has 
seemingly been a success. Although there is clear evidence of a frontier shift, we see that the 
“not so good” on average have increased their productivity more than the best practice units 
giving a sector that is more homogenous in 2001 than it was in 1996. Productivity growth has 
been slowed down due to an increase in the availability of resources, but this may be due to an 
increase in training costs, in which case it is likely to be transitional. Overall we conclude that 
productivity growth has been substantial, and further research should focus on the effects of 
various organisational models of BUP-clinics and both the level of and change in 
productivity. In this context the positive effect of increasing the share of university educated 
personnel could provide a fruitful starting point.    18
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